First, it reveals how Sata successfully built links with leading business elites who, in the expectation that he would help them secure their businesses, financed his electoral campaigns. This article uses a case study of Michael Sata, an individual politician who was twice elected Member of Parliament in Zambia’s capital city in the 1980s, to offer a two-fold reassessment of elections and patronage politics during the one-party state. Much of the scholarly work on politics in Zambia’s one-party state stresses the non-competitiveness of its parliamentary elections and holds that politicians were unable to cultivate the power of patronage because the political system was heavily weighted against the practice. Either way, the prospects for democracy are bleak. If the latter possibility proves to be closer to the mark, the civilian status of the Zimbabwean government is under threat-if it has not already fallen-and the continued militarization of the state and economy means that political and economic reforms are increasingly unlikely. If the former is true, the discrepancy between the president’s official statements in favour of peace and dialogue and the human rights abuses committed by the security forces is best interpreted as a ‘good cop/bad cop’ routine, designed to deceive the world into thinking that Mnangagwa is a ‘dove’, and signals that ZANU-PF has found a smarter way to sustain authoritarian rule. It is too early to make a definitive decision between these possibilities, but both have significant implications for the future of Zimbabwean politics.
Idle oil tycoon first retirement full#
The discrepancy between this violent crackdown and the president’s strategy up to that point suggests that he was either disingenuous about his intentions or that he is not in full control of the state. However, the shocking events of 1 August 2018 and early 2019 have cast a long shadow over the new administration. The ruling party ceded enough ground to make claims of reform credible, while retaining sufficient control over the key levers of power to ensure a favourable election result. In particular, we show that in an effort to legitimize his undemocratic rise to power, Mnangagwa positioned himself as the ‘change’ candidate and resorted to a mix of political theatre and soft reforms to endear himself to both Zimbabweans and the international community. In doing so, it highlights the rapidly shifting political playing field on which the new president found himself. This briefing seeks to shed light on how we should interpret recent events in Zimbabwe by providing an overview of the key themes of the 2018 elections. The authors argue that unless these networks are challenged and reformed, they will continue to keep citizens in poverty while those connected to the shadow state become increasingly rich. The third is the creation of monopolistic or oligopolistic conditions that increase prices and enable companies with links to the shadow state to make excessive profits. The second is the manipulation of government expenditure and other public resources and opportunities to sustain the patronage networks of the shadow state and ensure its political survival. The first is the creation of a culture of impunity that facilitates corruption and diverts resources away from productive investments. In addition to the obvious negative impact on democracy and accountability, the influence of shadow states tends to undermine inclusive development through three related processes. By mapping how these networks are organized across different groups and countries, the report reveals just how influential and resilient these groups have become, and the way in which many shadow states – but not all – have become integrated into transnational financial and in some cases criminal networks. To do this it maps the emergence of shadow states – networks of unelected businessmen, civil servants, political fixers, and members of the president’s family who wield more power than legislators – and how this varies across countries. This report addresses the rise of Shadow States in Africa, with case studies of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe as well as a comparative introduction by Nic Cheeseman.
0 kommentar(er)
